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A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH
not against the estate itself.621
Justice McHugh held in Sowa v. Huffinan6r that "[t]he duties of a
guardian ad litem, who is appointed pursuant to W.Va. Code, 27-11-1(b) [1990] to
represent an alleged incompetent in a competency proceeding, end when the




Use of the prior purchase price of property in an eminent domain
proceeding was addressed by Justice McHugh in West Virginia Department of
Highways v. Mountain Inc.624 In that opinion Justice McHugh held:
In an eminent domain proceeding to take private property for
public use the purchase price of the property approximately four
and a half years prior to the filing of such proceeding is not
admissible when there has been a showing that a substantial
change in the physical characteristics of the property has occurred
since the sale took place and the original purchase price is not
probative of the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking.
625
In the case of West Virginia Department of Highways v. Fisher,626 Justice
McHugh addressed the issue of jury bias or prejudice in an eminent domain
proceeding. The court held that
[i]n an eminent domain action, although all prospective jurors
stated that they could return a verdict free from bias or prejudice,
where the record indicates that [thirteen] prospective jurors were
acquainted with the landowners and/or their appraisal witnesses,
which witnesses testified at trial, and, of the petit jury selected
from those prospective jurors, six jurors were acquainted with the
landowners and/or such appraisal witnesses, a likelihood of bias or
prejudice on the part of the jury existed sufficient to require that
621 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
622 443 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va. 1994).
623 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
624 279 S.E.2d 192 (W. Va. 1981).
625 Id. at Syl.
626 289 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1982).
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the verdict of the jury be set aside and a new trial awarded.6 7
The case of West Virginia Department of Highways v. Roda628 involved
determining the value of coal on property taken by eminent domain. Justice
McHugh held in the opinion that
[i]n eminent domain proceedings, the date of take for the purpose
of determining the fair market value of property for the fixing of
compensation to be made to the condemnee is the date on which
the property is lawfully taken by the commencement of
appropriate legal proceedings pursuant to W.Va. Code, 54-2-14a,
as amended.6 9
Justice McHugh also stated that
[w]hen the contractor for the Department of Highways took the
landowners' property prior to the institution of lawful
condemnation proceedings, the trial judge did not err in refusing
to allow the introduction of evidence as to the value of such
property on a date prior to the institution of such proceedings. 630
Finally, Justice McHugh stated in Roda that
[w]hen a condemnor had prior knowledge that its contractor was
selling a condemnee's coal which had been severed from the land
before the institution of lawful condemnation proceedings, the fair
market value of the condemnee's coal, removed before the lawful
date of take, is the price for which the coal could be sold, ready
for loading, by a person desirous of selling to a person wishing to
buy, both freely exercising prudence and intelligent judgment as
to its value, without consideration of the mining, production,
excavation and marketing costs.63
B. Easement
In Sticklen v. Kittle,63 2 Justice McHugh held that "[a]n avigation easement
in the airspace used by aircraft over lands adjacent to an airport cannot be acquired
627 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
628 352 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1986).
629 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
630 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
631 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
632 287 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1981).
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by prescription. '"63
Justice McHugh was called upon to construe language in an indenture
granting a right-of-way easement in the case of Kell v. Appalachian Power Co.6m
Justice McHugh held in the opinion that
[1]anguage in an indenture which gives a power company the right
to cut and remove trees, overhanging branches or other
obstructions that endanger the safety, or interfere with the use, of
the power company's lines on the right-of-way granted by the
indenture does not authorize the power company to apply toxic
herbicides to that right-of-way by aerial broadcast spraying.635
C. Trustee Sale
Justice McHugh held in Dennison v. Jack 6 that "[t]he provisions of
W.Va. Code, ch. 38, art. 1, which permit, pursuant to the terms of a trust deed, a
public sale of property by a trustee upon the default of the grantor of the trust deed,
do not violate the public policy of this State."' 7 In Dennison, Justice McHugh also
stated:
Where a grantor executes a trust deed which confers upon the
trustee a power of sale, and upon default of the grantor, the
trustee, pursuant to the terms of the trust deed and W.Va. Code,
ch. 38, art. 1, sells the property granted by the trust deed at public
sale, such a sale does not involve significant action by the State of
West Virginia; therefore, due process imposed notice and hearing
to the grantor of the trust deed prior to the sale are not required by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States or W.Va. Const., art. II, § 10.6
In Villers v. Wilson,639 Justice McHugh held:
The sale of property by a trustee under a trust deed will not be
enjoined where the sole ground relied upon for the issuance of the
injunction is that the grantor of the trust deed has an unliquidated
claim against the creditor whose debt is secured by that trust deed
633 d. at Syl. PL 1.
634 289 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1982).
635 Id. at Syl.
636 304 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1983).
637 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
638 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
639 304 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1983).
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for damages arising out of a transaction unrelated to the trust deed
agreement.640
D. Tenants in Common
Justice McHugh held in Keller v. Hartman641 that
[w]here a tract of land is owned by tenants in common and one
tenant grants an easement to a third party, which by the express
terms of the grant, purportedly conveys only the grantor's
undivided interest, such grant is effective to create an easement on
the other tenants' interest, if the other tenant(s) consent to or
subsequently ratify the conveyance. 642
E. Restrictive Covenant
The case of Allemong v. Frendzel643 called upon Justice McHugh to
examine issues involving a restrictive covenant in a property deed. Justice McHugh
stated that "[t]he fundamental rule in construing covenants and restrictive
agreements is that the intention of the parties governs. That intention is gathered
from the entire instrument by which the restriction is created, the surrounding
circumstances and the objects which the covenant is designed to accomplish."
6 4
Justice McHugh noted next that "[a] valid restrictive covenant may be
enforced by one other than a party to the restrictive covenant provided that the
parties to the deed in which the restrictive covenant originated intended that the
restriction should benefit the land of the person claiming enforcement. '' 64 5 Justice
McHugh then concluded:
A restrictive covenant which provides "that no alcoholic
beverages shall be sold on said premises, and this covenant shall
run with the land" is valid. Where the grantor included the
covenant in all subsequent deeds conveying a particular parcel of
property with the intention to preserve and protect the quality of
the neighborhood, a trial court may grant injunctive relief against
a grantee who took the property with full notice of the restrictive
covenant, provided that changes in the neighborhood's character
are not so radical as to destroy the essential objects and purposes
640 Id. at Syl.
641 333 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1985).
642 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
"43 363 S.E.2d 487 (W. Va. 1987).
644 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
645 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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of the neighborhood's original plan of development. 6
F. Cemetery Plots
Justice McHugh addressed the legal sanctity of burial plots in Concerned
Loved Ones & Lot Owners Ass'n of Beverly Hills Memorial Gardens v. Pence. 6 7
The initial issue to be resolved was whether or not statutory restrictions imposed on
trustees of burial grounds and incorporated cemetery associations, with respect to
the sale of burial land, applied to others. In this opinion Justice McHugh held that
"[t]he provisions of W.Va. Code, 35-5-2 [1967] apply only to the types of entities
set forth in W.Va. Code, 35-5-1 [1931]. '"m Justice McHugh then held that "[w]hen
land has been dedicated to cemetery purposes, the next of kin of those buried in the
cemetery, as well as those who own land for burial in the cemetery, have a cause of
action to prevent, or recover damages resulting from, the unlawful desecration of
such cemetery."649
G. Surface Mining
Justice McHugh was called upon to harmonize state and federal law
involving replacement of water polluted by surfacing mining in the case of Russell
v. Island Creek Coal Co. 650 Justice McHugh held:
W.Va. Code, 22A-3-24(b), as amended, part of the West Virginia
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, which requires a coal
operator to replace the water supply of an owner of an interest in
real property whose water supply has been affected by
contamination, diminution or interruption proximately caused by
the surface-mining operation, but which statute further provides
that the replacement of the water supply may be waived by the
owner, is not inconsistent with the parallel federal provision
contained in 30 U.S.C. § 1307(b), part of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.651
In Phillips v. Fox,62 Justice McHugh set out the circumstances in which an
implied right to surface mine may occur. The court held:
646 Id at Syl. Pt. 4.
647 383 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1989).
648 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
649 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
650 389 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1989).
651 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
652 458 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1995).
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The grant of a right to surface mine may be express or implied.
The right to surface mine will only be implied if it is demonstrated
that, at the time the deed was executed, surface mining was a
known and accepted common practice in the locality where the
land is located; that it is reasonably necessary for the extraction of
the mineral; and that it may be exercised without any substantial
burden to the surface owner.
653
In West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection v. Kingwood Coal
Co., 65 4 Justice McHugh wrote:
Under 38 C.S.R. 2-2.84(b)(6) (1996), promulgated pursuant to the
West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W.Va.
Code, 22-3-1 et seq., owning or controlling coal to be mined by
another person under a lease, sublease or other contract and
having the right to receive such coal after mining or having
authority to determine the manner in which that person or another
person conducts a surface mining operation is presumed to
constitute ownership or control. In order to rebut this presumption
of ownership and control, the person subject to the presumption
must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it does
not in fact have the authority directly or indirectly to determine
the manner in which the relevant surface mining operation is
conducted. Whether a person has successfully rebutted a (b)(6)
presumption is a factual determination to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis.655
H. Zoning
Justice McHugh addressed issues involving nonconforming use of property
in H.R.D.E., Inc. v. Zoning Officer of City of Romney. 6 Justice McHugh held that
although the right to a nonconforming use when there is
something less than actual use is generally determined on a
case-by-case basis, the following factors are to be weighed when
determining whether or not a landowner has acquired a vested
right to a nonconforming use: (1) whether the landowner has made
substantial expenditures on the project; (2) whether the landowner
acted in good faith; (3) whether the landowner had notice of the
proposed zoning ordinance before starting the project at issue; and
653 Id. at Syl.
654 490 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1997).
655 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
656 430 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va. 1993).
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(4) whether the expenditures could apply to other uses of the land.
Mere contemplated use or preparation or preliminary negotiations
with contractors or architects will not vest the right to a
nonconforming use."
Justice McHugh concluded that "[a] landowner has a vested right to
complete a project as a nonconforming use when the landowner acted in good faith
while expending approximately $95,000 in preparing for the construction of a
specially designed building for the elderly and physically handicapped before the
municipality enacted a zoning ordinance.
''6 8
I. Real Estate Broker
The liability of a real estate broker for uninhabitable conditions of property
was the subject in Teter v. Old Colony Co.6 59 Justice McHugh wrote:
A vendor's real estate broker may be liable to a purchaser if the
broker makes material misrepresentations with regard to the
fitness or habitability of residential property or fails to disclose
defects or conditions in the property that substantially affect its
value or habitability, of which the broker is aware or reasonably
should be aware, but the purchaser is unaware and would not
discover by a reasonably diligent inspection. It also must be
shown that the misrepresentation or concealment was a substantial
factor in inducing the purchaser to buy the property.660
J. Landlord and Tenant
The issue of a landlord's liability to a tenant for criminal conduct by a third
party was addressed in Miller v. Whitworth.661 Justice McHugh ruled that
[u]nder the common law of torts, a landlord does not have a duty
to protect a tenant from the criminal activity of a third party.
However, there are circumstances which may give rise to such a
duty, and these circumstances will be determined by this Court on
a case-by-case basis. A landlord's general knowledge of prior
unrelated incidents of criminal activity occurring in the area is not
alone sufficient to impose a duty on the landlord. However, a duty
will be imposed if a landlord's affirmative actions or omissions
657 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
658 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
659 441 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1994).
660 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
661 455 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1995).
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have unreasonably created or increased the risk of injury to the
tenant from the criminal activity of a third party.
662
VIII. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LAW
A. Restitution
Justice McHugh held in State v. M.D.J.663 that
[a] trial judge may order restitution as part of a "program of
treatment or therapy" designed to aid in the rehabilitation of the
child in a juvenile case when probation is granted under W.Va.
Code, 49-5-13 [1978]. Such order, however, must be reasonable in
its terms and within the child's ability to perform.6 4
B. Substance Abuse
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. M.K. v. Black66 that "[u]nder the
provisions of W.Va. Code, 16-1-10(19) [1983], W.Va. Code, 27-1A-11 [1983], and
W.Va. Code, 27-5-9 [1977], the West Virginia Department of Health, through its
Director and other personnel, has an affirmative duty to provide a comprehensive
program for the care, treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile substance abusers.,
66 6
IX. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY LAW
A. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Authority to Regulate the
Practice of Law
Justice McHugh commented upon the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals' authority to regulate the practice of law in Committee on Legal Ethics of
West Virginia State Bar v. Ikner.667 The court held:
Under the authority of the Supreme Court of Appeal's inherent
power to supervise, regulate and control the practice of law in this
State, the Supreme Court of Appeals may suspend the license of a
lawyer or may order such other actions as it deems appropriate,
after providing the lawyer with notice and an opportunity to be
662 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
663 289 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1982).
664 Id. at Syl.
665 318 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1984).
666 Id. at Syl.
667 438 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1993).
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